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ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW IN THE WORKPLACE:
MOVING BEYOND THE IMPASSE
DALE LARSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Workplace antidiscrimination law sits at an impasse. Many
legal observers agree that the present fault-based legal regime does not
adequately account for discrimination as it occurs in the modem
workplace. These observers, however, continue to disagree on an
appropriate set of solutions.' This article seeks to expand on the
current dialogue by summarizing the state of the conversation,
highlighting the challenges confronting those in the antidiscrimination
project,2 and advocating for the adoption of a set of guiding principles
that can be used by practitioners to create action plans tailored to
individual circumstances and designed to meet the complex challenges
posed by employment discrimination in the modem workplace. These
action plans, taken in the aggregate, can help establish a new
normative theory that is more consistent with the realities of modem
discrimination.
The first guiding principle is that any action plan should
operate under the normative theory that the facilitation of
Copyright © 2010 by Dale Larson.
* Dale Larson currently practices law for a law firm in Los Angeles, California. Mr. Larson
received his J.D. from UCLA School of Law in 2009 where he was a Senior Editor on the
UCLA Law Review, and obtained his B.A. in Mathematics and Political Science in 1998 from
Duke University. Mr. Larson gives many thanks to Professor Gary Blasi at UCLA School of
Law for his guidance during this project, to the talented editors of the Maryland Law Journal
of Race, Religion, Gender and Class for their help in improving this Article, and to his wife,
Brooke, for her endless support.
1. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (2006); Gary Blasi, Default Discrimination:
Law, Science, and Unintended Discrimination in the New Workplace, 3 NYU SELECTED
ESSAYS ON LAB. & EMp. L. 3 (Mitu Gulati & Michael J. Yelnosky eds., 2007); Tristin K.
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91, 92-94 (2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger,
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1164-66 (1995); Katherine V.w. Stone,
The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and
Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REv. 519, 525-26 (2001); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 462-65
(2001).
2. The term "antidiscrimination project" refers to the ongoing dialogue among
academics and practitioners striving to reduce discrimination in American society.
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discriminatory bias in organizational decision making is itself a form
of discrimination. The practical effect of this theory is that employers
should be legally obligated to ensure that its systems and structures do
not facilitate this kind of discriminatory decision making. Second, an
action plan should seek to minimize the role of the courts by using the
law only as an incentive for the employer to reform. This is important
for three reasons: (1) to avoid the shortcomings of the courts in
implementing a structural solution; (2) to prevent attorneys from
resorting to resolutions such as monetary settlement or consent decrees
that are familiar yet disfavored because they do not fully achieve
structural reform; and (3) to maintain a working partnership among all
parties involved.3 Third, because minimizing the role of the courts by
using the law solely as an incentive for employer reform removes
traditional court-based forms of leverage, selecting a target defendant
susceptible to other forms of leverage is an important part of the plan.
Fourth, it is critical to actively engage market pressures, rather than
passively waiting for the market to encourage reform. Finally, any
action plan should be dynamic and flexible, emphasizing partnerships
and problem solving and avoiding a rules-driven solution, whether it is
in the form of government regulations or otherwise.
In practice, once the appropriate target defendant is selected
and a potential plaintiff is available, leverage can be applied in the
form of organizing, lobbying, and threatening a media campaign and
litigation. Most action plans developed under these guiding principles
would presumably incorporate this basic set of actions in some form.
Ideally, the target defendant would be a high-profile private employer
that relies heavily on the government for business. Leverage would be
used to persuade the employer to adopt a set of best practices,
including establishing an affirmative action program designed to
reduce the effects of subtle bias in the workplace. This process would
circumvent existing roadblocks and serve to establish the appropriate
norms. This course of action should be viewed as an iteration of a
3. Later in this article, I refer to this as avoiding the "Home Depot problem," referring
to the high-profile Home Depot class action consent decree, regarding which various
commentators have expressed mixed reviews. In this article, I argue that it is best to use
litigation as a last resort to eliminate certain familiar and comfortable resolution options, such
as monetary settlements and consent decrees. See infra Part iv.C. For more on the "Home
Depot problem," compare Sturm, supra note 1, at 509-19 (using a class action lawsuit
resulting in a consent decree against Home Depot as an example of a successful structural and
regulatory solution) with Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class
Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1249, 1285-89
(2003) (arguing that the consent decree did not result in successful reform at Home Depot).
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potentially cumulative process that, taken in the aggregate, could move
workplace antidiscrimination law beyond its current impasse.
In Part II of this article, I briefly discuss the current and
seemingly widely accepted4 argument that discrimination in the
workplace today is no longer the result of overt and intentional
animus, but is instead the result of implicit and subtle bias. This bias is
exacerbated by changes in the workplace that have flattened
hierarchical structures, spread decision-making responsibility, and
placed greater weight on frequent, subjective decisions. This argument
raises important normative questions. I adopt the normative position of
Professor Tristin Green that "the facilitation of discriminatory bias in
workplace decisionmaking" is itself a form of discrimination, which
establishes both "a normative-and corresponding-legal obligation on
the employers not to facilitate this kind of discriminatory decision
making in the workplace." 5 My objective is to expand and establish
this normative position. I conclude Part II by elaborating upon the
hypothetical example first introduced by Professor Gary Blasi6 of an
African American female attorney named "Patricia," working in a
private law firm. The hypothetical describes the subtle discrimination
Patricia experiences along with the negative effects of that
discrimination. In subsequent parts of this article, I continue her story
beyond its current diagnostic usage and use it prescriptively to help
propose a next step.
In Part III of this article, I describe what arguably is the best
hypothetical solution to workplace discrimination resulting from
implicit and subtle bias: a structural approach 7 utilizing best practices.
This requires multiple actors working together in collaboration in a
trial-and-error fashion guided by agreed-upon principles. While others
advocating such an approach have placed less weight on affirmative
action, I advocate for it enthusiastically because of the multiple
benefits it has as one possible antidote to the negative effects of
implicit bias. I conclude Part II by revisiting Patricia's workplace and
imagining what these best practices might look like at her law firm.
In Part IV, I consider the many difficulties that face
implementation of the strategies described in Part III. I begin Part IV
4. It at least appears that the argument is widely accepted among those who have
actively engaged in this dialogue. It is less clear that the argument is widely held among those
who do not think this dialogue is worth participating in or even having.
5. Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 852-53 (2007).
6. Blasi, supra note 1, at 5-6.
7. For more on the benefits and shortcomings of a structural approach, see infra Part
2009]
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by discussing the limitations of relying upon the marketplace to
encourage private employers to adopt these practices on their own. I
then briefly explain the shortcomings of utilizing a purely legislative
or regulatory approach with emphasis given to Professor Susan
Sturm's argument that a traditional rules-driven approach will fail.
Finally, I explore the many inherent problems in attempting to bring
about these practices in the courts by discussing the unwillingness and
lack of expertise of judges as well as the problems associated with
bringing in actors driven by interests that potentially conflict with each
other and with the goal of structural reform.
In Part V, I propose a set of guiding principles gleaned from
the lessons of the first three parts of this article. I use these principles
to provide an overview of a hypothetical action plan to address subtle
and structural discrimination. The action plan is designed to
circumvent obstacles and set a precedent to engender a normative
theory within the larger antidiscrimination community.
I conclude the article by discussing briefly ways to
institutionalize the results of the proposed course of action, and by
stressing the importance of scientific evaluation of the results. Because
the hypothetical actions are as much a means as an end, this process of
institutionalizing lessons learned is just as important as any steps taken
to make the initial actions successful.
II. SUBTLE AND STRUCTURAL RATHER THAN OVERT AND INDIVIDUAL
Many legal scholars have documented the wide chasm that
exists between how the law assumes discrimination occurs in the
workplace and how it actually takes place. 8 Presently, most
discrimination in the workplace is not the result of overt discrimination
by an individual with animus, but of subtler forms of discrimination,
driven by unconscious, or implicit, bias. Moreover, modem
workplaces often rely heavily on informal interactions and subjective
measures of performance, thereby increasing opportunities for subtle
discrimination to take place and harmfully affect employees.
Meanwhile, the law continues to assume that discrimination is only the
result of individual, explicit animus reflected clearly in the evidence of
the discriminatory act.9 Unfortunately, much disagreement persists
8. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 3; Blasi, supra note 1, at 3-4; Green, supra
note 1, at 91-94; Krieger, supra note 1, at 1164; Stone, supra note 1, at 597; Sturm, supra note
1, at 460-61.
9. Blasi, supra note 1, at 4.
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among legal scholars regarding how to close this chasm. Each of the
suggested solutions I propose implicates numerous obstacles.
I begin with a brief overview of the science of implicit bias and
an explanation of the impact this science has on our understanding of
discrimination in the workplace. I will then continue with a brief
exploration of how places of employment have changed since the
creation of our current antidiscrimination law and how these changes
exacerbate the negative effects of implicit bias in today's work
environment. Lastly, I use Professor Gary Blasi's Patricia hypothetical
to illustrate the above mentioned arguments.
A. Subtle Discrimination Resulting from Implicit Bias
It is generally accepted that much of our decision making and
behavior is affected not only by our conscious thought and belief
systems, but also by our unconscious, or implicit bias.10 Implicit bias is
made up of attitudes-likes or dislikes towards someone or
something-and stereotypes-traits associated with someone or
something." Implicit bias can be seen as an unconscious range of
associations, either favorable or unfavorable, that we have towards
individuals or groups of individuals. 12 Because the idea of implicit bias
has been very well documented by legal scholars in recent years, I will
not go into detail about how implicit bias works or how it affects our
daily lives. Instead, I will only mention a few characteristics of
implicit bias that are particularly relevant to the antidiscrimination
project.
First, implicit bias is very pervasive in our society. Our implicit
attitudes and stereotypes start forming at a very young age and are
used by our brains as a way to process the vast amounts of information
that we come into contact with each day. 13 Testing supports the
theoretical notion that implicit bias is prevalent, showing high
incidence rates of implicit bias towards many different groups,
10. See generally SUSAN T. FIsKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed.
1991) (discussing generally the area of social cognition and the working of conscious and
unconscious thought); Mahzarin R. Banaji, Jerry Kang & Kristin A. Lane, Implicit Social
Cognition and Law, 3 ANNu. REv. L. Soc. Sci. 427, 427 (2007); Anthony G. Greenwald &
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REv. 945, 946
(2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1489, 1508 (2003).
11. See Banaji, Kang, & Lane, supra note 10, at 429.
12. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 10, at 950-51.
13. See Krieger, supra note 1, at 1187-88.
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including racial groups and sex. 14 Bias against "out-group"', 5 members
and in favor of "in-group" 16 members is especially prevalent. 17 For
example, white individuals frequently show bias against individuals
from racial minority groups and, similarly, males frequently show a
preference for males over females. 18 Aside from its prevalence,
implicit bias is important in the antidiscrimination context because it
affects our decision making and other behavior,' 9 even though science
indicates that an individual can take steps to reduce those effects.2 °
Finally, we can change or even remove our implicit bias through the
use of de-biasin& agents-people or objects that decrease an
individual's bias -but debate exists as to the validity and
22
effectiveness of this process.
Because our contemporary society exhibits relatively fewer
incidences of overt discrimination based on explicit animus than in the
past, some observers have declared that discrimination no longer exists
in the modem workplace.23 Yet the opposite is true: Discrimination is
still extremely prevalent and typically takes the form of subtle actions
or decisions in which the actor or decision maker is unaware that bias
is playing any role at all.24 Indeed, numerous field studies utilizing
14. See Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36 (2007).
15. Out-group members are those not belonging to the individual's own identity groups.
16. In-group members are those belonging to the individuals same identity groups.
17. Nearly one hundred studies have documented "people's tendency to automatically
associate positive characteristics with their in-groups more easily than out-groups,"-a
phenomenon known as "in-group favoritism." See Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup
Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 Soc. JUST. RES..
143, 146 (2004). In-group favoritism is so strong that people report a preference to a group
even when randomly assigned to that group. See Banaji, Kang & Lane, supra note 10, at 433.
18. See Nosek, supra note 14.
19. For a succinct overview of many interesting studies on this topic, see Banaji, Kang
& Lane, supra note 10, at 1514-28.
20. Banaji, Kang & Lane, supra note 10, at 437-39. This idea of debiasing also plays a
role in this Article's advocacy for affirmative action discussed infra Part III.B.
21. A de-biasing agent is a counterexample brought to an environment, either as an
individual or as some physical feature, designed to positively alter the implicit bias of those
who work in that environment. In effect, they operate by presenting a biased individual with
an example that runs counter to the individual's existing associations and stereotypes, thereby
eroding those associations and stereotypes. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair
Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revison of "Affirmative Action", 94 CAL. L. REv. 1063, 1109
(2006) ("A debiasing agent is an individual with characteristics that run counter to the
attitudes and/or the stereotypes associated with the category to which the agent belongs.").
22. Id. at 437-39.
23. See, e.g., DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL
SOCIETY (The Free Press) (1995).
24. Blasi, supra note l, at 3, 8-10.
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tester methodology have resulted in social scientific evidence
overwhelmingly demonstrating that discrimination, including racial
discrimination, is still widespread.25
B. Changes in the Workplace
Because modem discrimination is typically the result of
frequent and subtle interactions, it is especially harmful to employees
in the contemporary workplace where changes in structure have placed
greater importance on casual interactions and subjective measures of
success. From approximately World War I through the late 1970s, the
workplace environment was typically hierarchical with rigid roles,
objective measures of productivity, and decision-making power
clustered at the top of the management structure. 26 Beginning in the
1980s, however, three types of change developed in workplaces. First,
there was a "flattening of hierarchies" resulting in the "blurring of job
boundaries" and the diminishment of management authority in
27
organizations. Second, workplaces saw an increase in the use of
work teams,28 including both formal work teams and informal
communities of practice within and between institutions. 29 Third, the
evaluation of work performance has moved from objective to
"decentralized, subjective, and contextual" measures, which are
inherently more dependent on social interaction and personal
observation.30 New measures value traits such as "creativity" and the
"ability to collaborate with others."
31
In the old workplace, there were fewer chances for subtle
discrimination because casual interactions played less of a role in
evaluations, and, therefore, there was generally less interaction
necessary to accomplish goals and lower-level managers and staff had
less decision-making authority. 32 Now, as casual interactions are both
more common and carry more weight in evaluations, employers must
continuously guard against their own implicit biases-a feat that
borders on impossible. Professor Green, author of Discrimination in
25. Id. at 6.
26. Green, supra note 1, at 99-100.
27. Id. at 101.
28. Id. at 102.
29. Id. at 103.
30. Id.
31. Blasi, supra note 1, at 14.
32. Id. at 13.
33. Id. at 15.
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Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate
Treatment Theory, observes that the "increased use of group work and
importance of social interaction also heighten the ability of
discriminatory bias to adversely affect the opportunity and
professional development of women and minorities. 3
4
Furthermore, Professor Blasi, author of Default
Discrimination: Law, Science, and Unintended Discrimination in the
New Workplace ("Default Discrimination"), explains that because of
the changes in the workplace, an employee's fate may be sealed long
before the employee's performance is formally reviewed because
countless casual workplace interactions, each possibly tainted by the
presence of unconscious bias, may have led to a loss of valuable
professional opportunities. 35 In today's workplace, there are daily
decisions made as to who will work on which projects and it is likely
that members of outgroups will often be overlooked in those
decisions. 36 When a manager is slightly uncomfortable around an
employee, even if the employer cannot determine why, this discomfort
may result in the manager finding another employee with whom to
work on an important team project.
C. A Hypothetical Example
In Default Discrimination, Professor Blasi contrasts the
experiences of two hypothetical African American associates in a law
firm from two different eras. 37 The first associate is the victim of overt
discrimination in the form of racist comments and dismissal in an old-
style hierarchical workplace in 1965.38 The second associate, named
"Patricia," is an associate at the same firm in 2004.39 I use Patricia's
story to explore a possible remedy to reduce the subtle discrimination
she experienced.
Patricia's modem-day law firm has adopted many of the
characteristics common in a new workplace: Work is conducted in
teams, evaluation emphasizes subjective criteria such as creativity and
the ability to work well with others, rather than "per-unit
productivity," and "projects are undertaken by ad hoc networks of
34. Green, supra note 1, at 105.
35. Blasi, supra note 1, at 5.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 5-13.
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id.
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lawyers and firms. 40 As a result, Patricia works in an environment
where she is vulnerable to many of the effects of unconscious bias.
The numbers reflect this reality: While the number of minority and
female associates in Patricia's hypothetical modem-day law firm
reflects the firm's professed commitment to diversity, the partners are
overwhelmingly white males.4 1 Even though the partners may be
aware of this incongruity, they do not know what to do about it
because they see no direct cause of it, and they have little incentive to
drastically alter the very status quo that put them in their positions of
42power.
Like her 1965 counterpart, Patricia is discharged from the firm,
but under markedly different conditions.43 In her final meeting, the
partners who let her go believe that they are "leaning over backward"
to avoid being biased, but cannot ignore the fact that Patricia has not
played a large role on many large cases and projects.44 To explain how
Patricia and her firm got to this point, Professor Blasi writes that "a[n]
observer with perfect information" would have seen "500 interactions
in the hallways and offices of the firm in which the daily decisions
about who works on what get made. 4 5 In those interactions, the other
person was never consciously aware of negative feelings about
Patricia, but Patricia was frequently on the losing end of those
decisions.46
Noted is Patricia's "234th Hallway Encounter. 4 7 In this
encounter, a white male partner named Frank "is quite certain that he
is neither racist nor sexist," and is looking for an associate to help out
on a major project.48 Thinking of who has impressed him the most in
the past, he inadvertently makes a mental list of all white males.49
While seeking out one of those males, he passes Patricia in the
hallway, but as in the past, "feels vaguely uneasy around her" because
40. Id. at 5-6.
41. This hypothetical situation is based on actual statistics of contemporary law firms.
See, e.g., Building a Better Legal Profession, http://www.betterlegalprofession.org (last visited
Oct. 14, 2009); and Catalyst, Women in Law (2009),
http://www.catalyst.org/file/208/qt womeninlaw.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
42. See Blasi, supra note 1, at 5.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id.
49. Id.
312 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 9:303
"he has the sense that she is judging him" and seems "rigid., 50 As a
result, he gives a quick greeting and continues on his way seeking the
young white men on his mental list.5' Patricia is aware of Frank's stiff
behavior, which she has sensed since the beginning of her
employment, but neither actor thinks much of this "234th Hallway
Encounter."
52
After being discharged, Patricia brings a Title VII claim against
the firm, but she faces huge obstacles with her litigation. While there is
statistical evidence that workplace dynamics within the firm have a
disparate impact on women and minorities, there is no specific
decision-making process that can be proven to be a source of this
impact.53 From an evidentiary standpoint, she cannot show a jury each
of the five hundred interactions referenced above, and even if she
could, she cannot compare her interactions with those of another
associate.54 Even if the interactions could be described perfectly, it
would show that none of the parties ever had anything but the best of
intentions, and that if they were prejudiced, they were unaware of it.55
Consequently, there is a concern that a judge or jury could not get past
"the psychology of blame," 56 a term used to describe the reality that
fact finders in our current judicial system are reluctant to impose
liability for unintended or unconscious actions. 57 In this reality, these
actions are simply not blameworthy. This, as commentators have
noted, raises important normative questions such as whether these
actions should be blameworthy, and, if so, whether there should be
legal remedies for these actions.58 The next section grapples with these
normative questions and establishes a normative foundation for the
remainder of this article.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Green, supra note 1, at 136.
54. Blasi, supra note 1, at 5.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 6.
57. Id.
58. Compare Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 34-40 (arguing that antidiscrimination law
currently suffers from the absence of normative principles that determine what is considered
wrongful and unlawful behavior in the workplace) with Green, supra note 5, at 854-65
(striving to set a normative foundation for a structural approach by imposing a normative and
corresponding legal obligation on employers not to facilitate decision-making processes in the
workplace that result in discriminatory actions of any kind).
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D. Normative Implications
Some commentators have noted that because the law does not
clearly define unlawful behavior, a lack of guiding normative
principles is the primary barrier preventing antidiscrimination law
from being consistent with the realities of workplace discrimination.
5 9
Scholars can deduce what action an employer could take that would be
more or less helpful to reduce discrimination, but this does not
necessarily indicate what behavior should be considered wrongful or
unlawful. Consistent with this critique, "[T]he best the law can do in
such circumstances is set up a process that assures that... those
lessons will be progressively incorporated into the law.6 1 Even this
approach, however, is problematic because different people take
different lessons from the same experiences. 62 If the lack of normative
principles is the primary barrier to modernizing antidiscrimination law,
the best solution may be to rely on "politics and social change rather
than the narrow confines of legal doctrine." 63 Such an approach is
designed to create and establish norms within the political and social
realms, and allow them to permeate the courts over time.
Professor Green argues that it is important to establish a
particular working normative theory that we can refine and promote.
64
His theory "identifies the facilitation of discriminatory bias in
workplace decisionmaking as a form of discrimination." 65 The result is
that we should "impose a normative and corresponding legal
obligation on employers not to facilitate discriminatory
decisionmaking in the workplace." 66 The emphasis is on the employer
as a collective entity, rather than on an individual. The normative
weight comes from the resulting effect on the employees. "If an
employer's undisciplined system of subjective decision making has
precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible
intentional discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII's
59. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 35 ("Unless we have an operating theory of what is
wrongful about discrimination, we cannot know what kinds of 'second generation' conduct...
should count as unlawful or improper discrimination.").
60. Id. at 36.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 45.
64. See Green, supra note 5, at 851.
65. Id. at 852-53.
66. Id.
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proscription against discriminatory actions should not apply."
67
Therefore, "structural discrimination is a workplace wrong," and
"employers, as organizational actors, are active, causal participants in
the problem of structural discrimination," which creates a normative
and legal obligation.
68
This is, of course, only a normative theory and requires further
elaboration over time. Courts do not currently adopt this normative
view, although some scholars opine that the public at large and courts
generally have been receptive to this theory.69 Certain data indicates
that the public holds organizations accountable when their "policies
and operations... suggest an internal decision structure that leads to
acts of wrongdoing."' While some argue that the Supreme Court and
lower courts have been willing to hold employers responsible for the
problem of structural antidiscrimination under a similar normative
theory, at least in the context of class actions,71 others contend that the
key decisions in this area are outdated and lower courts have been
reluctant to take this approach. A lengthy valuation of the merits of
each position is not needed here, as I advocate for immediate steps to
avoid workplace discrimination that do not rely on the current norms
espoused by either the courts or the public. Instead, I recommend
adopting a working normative theory and taking steps independent of
the realities of what norms are currently prevalent in the courts in
order to entrench that working normative theory.
This process of elaborating and entrenching norms is a vital but
highly difficult component of the overall goal of getting the law to
treat discrimination as it actually occurs. There is debate as to whether
norms can be "pushed" at all: "[N]ormative elaboration occurs through
a fluid, interactive relationship between problem solving and problem
definition within specific workplaces and in multiple other arenas,
67. Id. at 896 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-91
(1988)).
68. Id. at 884.
69. Id. at 895 (arguing that even the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to hold
employers responsible for structural discrimination and that individuals are willing to hold
organizations accountable for internal decision structures that lead to acts of wrongdoing).
70. Id. at 895 (quoting Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Distributing Responsibility
for Wrongdoing Inside Corporate Hierarchies: Public Judgments in Three Societies, 21 L.
Soc. INQ. 815, 853 (1996)).
71. See generally Tristin Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for
Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 692-98 (2003) (arguing that both lower courts
and the Supreme Court have accepted the view that organizational structures that perpetuate
past segregation as well as organizational structures that facilitate present discrimination can
provide a common ground for class treatment).
72. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 21-24.
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including but not limited to the judiciary., 73 A fluid process like this
would seemingly be difficult to control and predict as various actors
may work to entrench the wrong normative lessons. Professor
Bagenstos notes that "the norms of managers and human resource
professionals exert a powerful influence over actors who have no
formal connection to management." 74 The reason for this is that the
human resource professionals try certain practices and document them
in journals without proper scientific inquiry, which then influences the
managers and entrenches bad practices. 
5
The set of actions I propose does not seek to control the fluid
process that governs norms, but instead to provide a concrete example
of a successful set of actions that promote the normative theory either
as an academic lesson or as a blueprint for future similar actions. One
key, which I will discuss later in this article, is to deploy adequate
scientific inquiry into the process and solution used to avoid the
harmful cycle of documenting and reinforcing bad practices. Thus, the
goal is a fairly conservative one: to influence the fluid process of
normative elaboration as described by Professor Bagenstos by starting
with a working normative theory, taking and documenting actions that
assume the existence of the proposed norms, and hoping that the
actions and documentation serve as an example that promotes the
existence of the normative theory.
Another normative issue commonly raised when discussing
subtle and implicit bias is the psychology of blame. 76 The argument is
that if discriminatory actions result from something beyond the
conscious control of the employer, then it would be wrong to hold that
employer legally liable or even consider him to be normatively at
fault.7 As Professor Green notes, however, this argument is the result
of conflating individual culpability with employer wrong.7 8 As noted
earlier, the normative theory asserted here focuses on the employer as
an organizational entity and posits that the wrong is committed in the
facilitation of subjective practices that result in discrimination, rather
than in the individual act itself. In the current political climate, it may
be wise from an advocacy point of view to promote this structural
normative view rather than to move towards an individual causation
73. Sturm, supra note 1, at 462-63.
74. Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 34.
75. Id. at 30.
76. See Blasi, supra note 1, at 6.
77. Id.
78. Green, supra note 5, at 897-98.
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requirement. 79 With the proposed structural normative theory in place,
we can discuss possible practical solutions.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
With an updated understanding of how discrimination takes
place in the workplace, it becomes clear that a regime based on
individual liability is insufficient. The tort-like model currently used in
antidiscrimination law is outdated and does not reflect the fact that
discrimination today is pervasive and not always the result of
intentional behavior. 80 "If we treat discrimination as a fact of
American life.., employment discrimination looks less like a personal
tort and more like water pollution or widespread tobacco smoking."
8
'
Accordingly, we should look to how the law has dealt with those
analogous problems. When we do so, we see that rather than relying
only on individual tort remedies 82 to combat discrimination, we should
move to structural solutions akin to the regulatory schemes associated
with pollution or tobacco smoking, and the voluntary or forced
adoption of employer best practices and affirmative action policies.
A. Best Practices
Employers can take many actions to reduce the likelihood that
subtle discrimination will play a harmful role in the workplace. While
there is no one set of actions that fits all workplaces, 83 core principles
can guide employers committed to creating a workplace with less
subtle and structural discrimination. We can view these best practices
as doing two things: (1) working at the individual actor level to reduce
implicit bias and curb the harmful effects of implicit bias through self
correction; and (2) working at the structural level to reduce the
likelihood that employees will be subjected to discrimination of any
kind.
Best practices aimed at individual self-correction should strive
to manage norms of egalitarianism. It has been shown that
79. Id. at 898.
80. Blasi, supra note 1, at 4.
81. Id.
82. Nevertheless, it is clear that tort-like remedies should still be available to address
discrimination resulting from explicit animus. See id. at 17.
83. See Green, supra note 71, at 672; see also, Sturm, supra note 1, at 461 (arguing that
specific and detailed rules will not work in this context and will inevitably prove to be either
under- or overinclusive).
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"foregrounding widely held egalitarian norms can counter automatic
stereotyping." 8 In other words, if a workplace succeeds in promoting
the idea that egalitarianism is best, then individuals operating under
that permeated norm will be less likely to act on their implicit bias.85
Also, employers can take steps to de-bias individuals through the use
of de-biasing agents and training. 86 These solutions remain largely
theoretical, and there is some evidence to suggest that they can be
harmful.87 Due to what some have called a rebounding effect,
individuals may react with increased animus towards a group after
attempts have been made to decrease that individual's bias towards the
group.88 Reactance theory suggests that people will react against
threats that limit their personal sense of behavioral freedom.
Correction theory takes this one step further to posit "that people do
not simply resist attempts at control[;] . . . they assess the direction and
extent of potential influence and then adjust and calibrate their
responses to compensate for this impact." 89 Because of this possible
outcome, it is important that solutions not be limited to self-correction
at the individual level, but instead should strive "to minimize the
operation of discriminatory bias by altering the workplace context in
which day-to-day perceptions and judgments are made."90 This, then,
is why best practices focused on structural solutions are also vital.
At the structural level, an important component to a best-
practices regime is to require employers to report on the practices they
have adopted to combat subtle and structural discrimination, as well as
84. Blasi, supra note 1, at 21.
85. The jury context has produced interesting results that support this idea. For example,
in the days of Jim Crow, Clarence Darrow successfully argued to a white jury that it must
resist being discriminatory when he was defending a black man charged with killing white
man. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decision Makers Break the
Prejudice Habit, in CRITICAL RACE REALISM 11, 26-27 (Gregory S. Parks et al, eds., 2008);
Blasi, supra note 1, at 21.
86. Because our implicit bias is malleable, some believe that de-biasing agents-people
or objects used to reduce implicit bias in an individual--can be used in an employment setting.
This could be in the form of simply hanging up pictures of famous and well-regarded African
American or women, leaders, for example, or in raising self-awareness of the possibility of
bias in decision making in the workplace. This latter example can be achieved through
improved training. See generally Banaji, Kang, & Lane, supra note 10, at 437-39. Other
options would be career planning and ongoing workshops.
87. Green, supra note 5, at 859.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 859 (quoting Kerry Kawakami et al., Kicking the Habit: Effects of
Nonstereotypic Association Training and Correction Processes on Hiring Decisions, 41 J.
Exp. SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 73 (2005)).
90. Id. at 860.
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the results of those efforts. 91 This process promotes accountability,
self-reflection, and recalibration. In addition to this ongoing
commitment to monitoring and evaluation, there are several
experimental safeguards that employers could put in place. First, an
employer could implement "heterogeneous work and decision-making
groups. 92 Similarly, an employer should create "interdependence
among in-group and out-group members.. ."93 Employers should also
consider "providing structure and guidance for appraisal and
evaluation, and making decisionmakers accountable for their
decisions."94 Finally, in addition to the self-reporting mentioned
above, employers should practice "monitoring for systemic patterns
that may develop from seemingly individualized internal conflicts."
95
Again, the specific ways that each of these practices would be adopted
in any given workplace will vary from employer to employer, or even
from office to office within one employer.
Professor Susan Sturm emphasizes collaborative problem
solving processes that bring in a number of actors who can help
identify organizational dimensions of a problem, encourage different
organizations to gather and share information, build both individual
and institutional capacity to respond to the problem, and design and
evaluate solutions that involve "employees who participate in the day-
to-day patterns that produce bias and exclusion."9 According to
Professor Sturm, a solution that is either entirely externally imposed or
internally generated will likely prove to be problematic because it will
either clash with the organization's context or be insufficiently
attentive to normative implications.97 Noting a growing trend towards
implementing this type of problem solving, 98 Professor Sturm
underscores the "pivotal role of intermediaries" to bridge
"conventional dichotomies such as public/private, legal/nonlegal,
general/contextual, coercive/cooperative." 99 As I note infra, the use of
intermediaries may be cause for concern regarding the likelihood of
success of this type of structural approach.
91. Blasi, supra note 1, at 22.
92. Green, supra note 1, at 147.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Idat 148.
96. Sturm, supra note 1, at 475.
97. Id. at 475-76.
98. Id. at 462.
99. Id. at 522-24. The potential problems of relying so heavily on these types of
intermediaries are explored in Part IV, infra.
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B. Affirmative Action
Affirmative action should also be a part of an employer's
antidiscrimination practices because it plays three distinct roles in
combating the harmful effects of implicit bias. The first and most
commonly understood role of affirmative action is remedial in nature,
in that it is simply a tool to compensate members of disadvantaged
groups that have lost opportunities as a result of implicit bias.'00 The
second role is based on contact theory, which holds that the more an
individual interacts with members of a disadvantaged group, the more
likely that individual will suppress stereotypes and bias against that
group. 1 1 This effect may be more pronounced when the members of a
disadvantaged group are in a managerial role, as studies have found
that bias is mitigated when people "are in the presence of authority
figures who are members of minority groups."'
0 2
The third role is to compensate for the fact that out-group bias
is generally stronger among whites than other groups. 1°3 A rarely
discussed'0 4 controversial theory is that one way to "reduce the
automatic and unconscious effects of particular stereotypes in decision
makers" is by placing more members of the groups that whites tend to
stereotype in management positions. '05 The theory is that because a
black individual is less likely to possess strong out-group implicit bias,
a black manager with equal qualifications will be less likely to harbor
unknowing bias that would affect his or her employees than a similarly
situated white manager. It seems that a simpler and fairer solution
would be to use a test that measures implicit bias, such as the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) 10 6 on all managers, regardless of their race, to
ensure that decision-makers in the organization are not highly
100. See generally Banaji, Kang & Lane, supra note 10. See also Christine Jolls & Cass
R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 984-85 (2006).
101. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 65,
66-67 (1998).
102. Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 16.
103. See Nosek, supra note 14.
104. Blasi, supra note 1, at 20.
105. Id. at 19-20.
106. The IAT, developed in 1998, is a web-based test that can test either implicit attitudes
or implicit stereotypes in an individual by measuring automatic group-valence (implicit
attitudes) and group-trait (implicit stereotypes) associations. The IAT works by measuring
response time to various stimuli. The amount of time it takes to make an association between
two stimuli corresponds to their associational strength in the individual's brain. Banaji, Kang,
& Lane, supra note 10, at 431. Anybody can take an IAT to measure their own implicit bias.
See Project Implicit, http://www.projectimplicit.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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biased. 0 7 Even without use of the IAT, however, affirmative action
may help to reduce the number of biased decision makers in
management positions.
C. Applying These Solutions to the Hypothetical Example
Going back to the hypothetical situation involving Patricia,
what practices could Patricia's firm implement to repair the structural
deficiencies that caused a seemingly fair person such as Frank, the
white partner, to contribute to the ongoing pattern of preferential
treatment of white males? The firm could start with the basic
recognition that the discrepancy in the percentage of minority partners
as compared to associates might present a potential problem and may
indicate that the disparate impact is a result of its policies. This should
alert the firm that there may be structural shortcomings that it needs to
address. The firm should then examine its procedures in light of the
possibility that subtle discrimination is present, develop a set of
practices to improve its procedures, and find a way to monitor its
efforts going forward.
For the fact-finding portion of this plan, the firm can rely on
existing models. Professor Sturm documented the success of the fact-
finding portion of a best practices implementation at the accounting
and consulting firm Deloitte & Touche ("Deloitte"). 10 8 Deloitte
created a task force to conduct a thorough investigation into the trend
that women were not being promoted at the rate at which men were
being promoted. 0 9 Deloitte "was careful to include a cross-section of
the organization that was diverse based on age, sex, geography,
department, and family status."' 10 Also, there was complete buy-in
from the top, as was evidenced by the fact that the CEO chaired the
task force and attended all of its meetings.'11 It would be important to
get buy-in from the top ranks at Patricia's firm, and obtaining that buy-
in should be a goal of any plan undertaken. Once that buy-in is
present, Patricia's firm could create a task force similar to that used by
Deloitte.
The next step would be to develop a solution that is specifically
tailored to Patricia's firm. Again, the case study of Deloitte is
107. Of course determining what constitutes "highly biased" is a difficult proposition,
making this solution quite complex.
108. See Sturm, supra note 1, at 492-93.
109. Id.
110. Id.at493.
111. Id..
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illustrative. Deloitte created a joint internal and external task force to
develop a proposed solution. 112 The external advisory group included
highly visible figures from the business community and the public.
13
The internal and external task force developed a series of guiding
principles to implement a solution.
1 14
Perhaps the biggest lesson here is that the solution
implemented at Deloitte, along with the solutions implemented in
other case studies that Professor Sturm analyzed, was designed to
capitalize on the strengths of the organization. 1 5 At Deloitte, the
management consultants were able to effectively leverage local
management personnel to implement procedures, and were also able to
create an efficient means of reporting. The method fit the firm's
"project-oriented work ethic."" 6 At Patricia's firm, the lawyers also
have a project-oriented work ethic, but may be less adept at
determining the most efficient ways to tap into management personnel.
The firm should be skilled at tracking and reporting, and could
emphasize that as a part of their solution. In addition, any solution that
efficiently incorporates the attorneys' natural aptitude at problem
solving and analysis is probably likely to be successful. Patricia's firm
may also consider implementing career-planning workshops for its
career-oriented employees. Although these examples are only
generalities, they are designed to show the thought process that should
be involved with these decisions.
It will be crucial for Patricia's firm to monitor progress made
towards reaching its goals and to always investigate signs that certain
processes are not working. For instance, at Deloitte, when the firm was
having trouble assigning women to projects on par with those given to
male employees, it required managers at all levels to create annual
assignment reviews, which raised the awareness of potential and
previously undetected bias among officers. 1 7 Similarly, Patricia's firm
should not only monitor all processes that have been put in place for
this project, but should also require partners to document all
assignment decisions for cases and projects and to explain
discrepancies between different groups wherever they exist.
To implement internal affirmative action, a firm may adopt a
policy that partners are required to create teams that are as racially and
112. Id. at 494-95.
113. Id. at 495.
114. Id. at 495-96.
115. Id. at 498.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 496.
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gender diverse as reasonably possible, and to create greater
interdependencies between in-group and out-group members. A firm
could also provide training on how to conduct evaluations, both for
short-term and long-term team performance and more formal annual
reviews and promotion considerations. A firm may consider adopting
more objective standards where subtle discrimination is less likely to
play a role, such as number of hours worked, although even this metric
could be affected by what work partners assign to different associates.
A firm should make it clear that decision makers will be held
accountable for their decisions and that discrimination, even
unconscious discrimination, will not be tolerated. This will reinforce
egalitarian norms and increase self-awareness. Unfortunately, it is
unlikely that Patricia's firm will implement all of these changes
without incentives. In Part IV, I discuss the difficulties in getting
employers to implement these structural solutions.
PART IV: DIFFICULTIES IN ENACTING THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
When talking about difficulties in implementing a structural
approach, one could assert as a bar the lack of a guiding normative
theory. 118 In this article, I hope to move beyond this problem,
however, and instead imagine a solution that serves as a practical
example of the normative theory I propose. Even after eliminating
normative concerns, however, there are still a host of practical
concerns to overcome.
A. Relying on the Marketplace
One possible approach to the problem of employer resistance
to implementing solutions is to rely on the market to exert pressure on
employers to adopt best practices. This strategy presupposes, however,
that consumers would avoid employers who fail to adopt such
practices. Aside from the fact that this solution would not work in the
government context, commentators have argued that market pressures
alone are insufficient. 1 9 First, immediate costs to adopting best
practices will often be substantial, and even if there are long-term
financial benefits to creating a discrimination-free workplace, an
employer may place more weight on the short-term costs than the
long-term financial benefits.' 20 A second concern with relying on
118. See supra Part I.D.
119. Green, supra note 71, at 672.
120. Id. at 672-73.
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market pressures is that it is unlikely that the public will generate
much market pressure in the absence of high-profile litigation, which
serves a role of informing the public about an employer's current
employment practices. 12 1 Without the litigation, which I noted earlier
is difficult under current legal norms, the public is likely to remain
blissfully unaware of problematic employment structures, and
therefore not generate much market pressure to reform. 12 2 Finally,
there will be times when economic costs will simply outweigh market
benefits, even considering potential long-term financial benefits of
reducing discrimination in the workplace.
B. Relying on Legislation or Executive Regulations
Another method for achieving the implementation of best
practices is to rely on legislation or executive regulation to force
employers to adopt antidiscrimination best practices. However, there
are two major problems with such a strategy. First, in today's political
and social climate, under existing norms, it would be difficult to pass
meaningful reform legislation. Second, even if passed, it is highly
unlikely that such an approach would prove to be successful because
an effective solution must be tailored to the situation and to the context
of any given organization, which neither specific nor ambiguous laws
can do.
Regarding the passage of legislation, Professor Blasi writes
that changing Title VII law will require withstanding "significant
political and doctrinal obstacles...,,124 Professor Blasi concludes that
this is tied to the prevalence of psychology of blame in our society:
people are not willing to hold individual actors liable for behavior
resulting from unconscious bias.' 25 I hope that progress based on a
series of actions like the ones I propose in this article will help people
to see organizational liability as separate from the concept of
individual liability. Another potential barrier is that in periods of deep
economic recession like the one the United States is currently
experiencing, the government may be reluctant to pass measures that
place a financial burden on employers.
121. Id.
122. As we will see later, however, using litigation in this context is fraught with plenty
of concerns.
123. Green, supra note 71, at 674.
124. Blasi, supra note 1, at 6.
125. Id.
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Even if legislation was enacted or regulations were
promulgated, it is unlikely that these measures would be successful
because a rule-enforcement model "encourages lawyers to see issues
as potential legal claims, rather than as problems in need of systemic
resolution."' 126 This "narrow focus on avoiding liability diverts
attention from the structural dimensions underlying the legal
violations.' 27 Inevitably, specific and detailed rules prove to be either
over- or underinclusive, or both. 128 On the other hand, "laws that are
ambiguous... invite symbolic responses...,,' 29 As we have already
seen, an effective solution must be tailored to the situation and to the
context of any given organization, and the solution must be flexible in
order to adapt as lessons are learned. Relying on legislation or
regulation would make it too easy for employers to comply without
doing real work to solve systemic problems.
C. Relying on the Courts and Litigation
Another way to ensure the implementation of best practices is
to rely on the courts and litigation. However, two high hurdles
confront a strategy that relies upon the courts to realize a structural
solution. First, judges are unwilling and lack the expertise to order this
type of arrangement, and to oversee its successful implementation. 130
According to Professor Bagenstos, courts have a track record of
engaging in this type of contextualized inquiry under two areas of
antidiscrimination law, and have a discouraging track record in both
areas. 31 In the context of disparate impact challenges to subjective
employment practices and in workplace harassment cases, 132 courts
have been unwilling to engage in the necessary contextualized
inquiry. 33 The result is similar to the likely outcome of a strategy that
relies upon legislative or regulatory solutions: Employers have found
ways to easily circumvent requirements without actually fixing
systemic problems.' 34 In both types of cases, judges are aware of their
lack of knowledge and feel the effects of immense docket pressures.' 35
126. Sturm, supra note 1, at 476.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 461.
129. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 28.
130. Id. at 21-26
131. Id. at 21-25.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 22-23.
134. Id. at 24-25.
135. Id. at 25.
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Judicial shortcomings are the primary reason that litigation should be
avoided.
Second, relying on attorneys and other human resources
professionals within a litigation context is problematic because it is
doubtful that we can trust intermediaries to internalize and pursue
structural and systemic goals.136 Frequently, other goals of
intermediaries, such as managerial goals, trump the goals of structural
reform.' 37 In practice, even when intermediaries do a good job of
urging employers to adopt certain procedures, "there is scant evidence
that that the responses urged by intermediaries actually result in equal
treatment or unbiased decisionmaking.' 38 As mentioned previously,
there is also a legitimate fear that intermediaries will document bad
practices in journals without scientific inquiry, and that these bad
practices will then become entrenched as best practices.
1 39
The third reason to avoid litigation is to minimize the harmful
effects of attorney self-interest. If it is true that plaintiffs' lawyers will
take the option of money over structural reform,1 40 then by not
engaging in actual litigation, and by using litigation to gain collective
leverage, plaintiffs' attorneys will be stripped of certain familiar and
comfortable resolution options, such as monetary settlements or
consent decrees. Monetary settlements would arguably not lead to a
sound structural solution. A consent decree may be somewhat
successful, but it is fraught with potential problems. First, a consent
decree is more likely to lead to a relationship characterized by the
"narrow focus of avoiding liability [that] diverts attention from the
structural dimensions underlying the legal violations...,,lal This
presents the same pitfalls inherent in a strategy that relies on
compliance with rules and regulations noted earlier.
In addition, consent decrees bring with them a long history of
reluctant defendants. Professor Sturm cites the Home Depot class
action as an example of a consent decree that successfully resulted in
structural reform, but Professor Michael Selmi142 effectively refutes
this account. Professor Selmi maintains that money played too large a
role in the settlement process and that the resulting large sum of the
settlement clouded the fact that the "agreement did not provide for any
136. Id. at 27.
137. Id. at 28.
138. Id. at 29.
139. Id. at 30.
140. Id. at 33.
141. Sturm, supra note 1, at 476.
142. Selmi, supra note 3, at 1285-89.
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specified jobs for class members, nor did it require any specific
goals."' 4 3 The long-term structural gains were not the focus. In order
to avoid this "Home Depot problem," in which money is the primary
focus of settlement, I advocate for eliminating monetary settlements
and consent decrees by not entering into direct litigation unless other
sources of leverage fail entirely.
Asking plaintiffs' attorneys to spend many hours on a case like
this without entering into formal litigation raises questions about
attorney compensation. Without litigation, neither fee shifting nor
contingency compensation is an option. While this is a desirable effect
in terms of controlling for attorney self-interest, in reality, it will
greatly limit the number of attorneys willing and able to engage in this
kind of work. 144 As long as some attorneys are still able to undertake
this type of project by financing it with earnings from other cases, this
may be a good thing, since only those motivated by the desire to see
real reform of discriminatory employment practices will involve
themselves in the process. This limitation might even act as an
effective filter to ensure that the ideal lawyers are working on these
cases.
If eliminating litigation restricts an attorney's ability to fall
back on a comfortable monetary settlement, it does not completely
remove money as a competitor for the attorney's time and resources.
Because of the limited options to make money on a case like this, an
attorney may find that other paying cases necessarily take priority,
possibly reducing the effectiveness of the attorney's counsel on a case
such as this. This is a very real concern, and as a result, more thought
should go into the issue of attorney compensation in these types of
situations.
These recommendations are not meant to suggest that the
courts will never play an active role in holding employers liable for
facilitating subtle and systemic discrimination or in getting employers
to adopt best practices. The point here is two-pronged: Courts do not
currently appear ready for this role, and we do not have to wait for the
courts to be ready in order to motivate employers to adopt best
practices and to begin to establish the proposed working normative
theory.
143. Id. at 1285.
144. See id. at 1327, 1330.
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V. A PROPOSED SET OF ACTIONS
A. Guiding Principles
The limitations I discuss in Part IV should not deter efforts to
achieve meaningful structural reform and reduce discrimination in the
workplace. Instead, there is no easy path and that creative lawyering is
necessary to achieve real results. 1 5 Based upon the lessons discussed
above, I assert several guiding principles designed to generate a set of
actions that might help modernize workplace antidiscrimination law.
It is worth repeating that these actions are based on the premise
that an employer should be held liable for the facilitation of subtle
discrimination in the workplace. 146 Beyond that normative foundation,
the actions taken should minimize the role of courts for the three
reasons discussed in Part IV.' 47 This does not mean that the law plays
no role; instead, liability avoidance should serve both as an incentive
and an organizational justification for reform.1 48 Other sources of
leverage, therefore, must be found. The primary way to apply
additional leverage will be to actively engage market forces. This can
be done most effectively where a high-profile private employer relies
heavily on one large consumer-the local or state government-for a
substantial amount of business. In this case, simply lobbying the right
government official or officials can impose great financial pressure on
the employer. Our solution must also be dynamic and flexible,
emphasizing partnerships and problem solving and avoiding a rules-
driven solution, whether it is in the form of government regulations or
otherwise.
B. A Sample Action Plan
As noted above, it is important to find a potential defendant
who is a private employer relying heavily on the government for
income. 149 This employer should exhibit the characteristics of a
145. See supra, Part IV.
146. See supra, Part I.
147. See supra, Part IV.
148. Id. These two roles that the law plays were prominent in all three of Professor
Sturm's cases studies. See Sturm, supra note 1, at 520.
149. This Article originally envisioned a government employer such as the Office of the
City Attorney as a target defendant, but upon further contemplation, it seemed as though there
were too many obstacles to overcome. The biggest obstacle is that it seemed unlikely that the
City Attorney would care much about our organizing campaign given that issues more
important to the public would have trumped the electoral significance of this campaign.
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modem workplace that have been discussed, 150 and a potential plaintiff
or class of plaintiffs must be identified in order to maintain the threat
of litigation, and thereby retain liability avoidance as an incentive. The
plaintiff would have to be willing to be a part of an effort to achieve
structural reform at the firm knowing that there are no material
benefits to participation. The plaintiff should know that litigation is a
possibility down the road but that the goal is to avoid it. For purposes
of this article, I will assume that Patricia and her firm fit this
description of an ideal plaintiff and defendant, respectively.
Once the target defendant has been identified, a multi-pronged
plan should be enacted. In order for the employer to be a serious
partner in this reform, the employer must feel strongly motivated to
begin the process of structural reform, even if the initial costs are
substantial. The multi-pronged plan is designed to motivate the
employer through organizing, lobbying, an actual or threatened media
campaign, and the threat of litigation.
The organizing component could begin with outreach to
identity organizations such as the Mexican American Legal Defense &
Education Fund (MALDEF), the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the National
Organization for Women (NOW). The goal would be for these
organizations to contact the employer to let the employer know that
their constituents are subjected to disparate treatment at the firm, and
that steps should be taken to remedy this problem. The next stage of
organizing could include organizations that monitor diversity at
various law firms, such as "Building a Better Legal Profession."'' 51
Even more effective would be the threat of going to the actual law
schools themselves or to websites read by law firm recruits152 to
organize an awareness campaign for potential new hires that the firm
in question engages in systemic practices that disadvantage women
and people of color, thus impacting their recruiting ability. The goal of
these measures would be to help the firm realize that structural reform
is beneficial to their ongoing recruiting efforts.'
53
150. See supra, Part II.
151. Started in 2007 by Stanford Law Students, Building a Better Legal Profession states
that its mission is to seek "market-based workplace reforms in large private law firms by
publicizing firms' self-reported data on billable hours, pro bono participation, and
demographic diversity." Building a Better Legal Profession,
http://www.betterlegalprofession.org/mission.php (last visited on November 20, 2009).
152. One example would be AboveTheLaw.com.
153. This was also the case in Professor Sturm's case study of Deloitte & Touche. See
Sturm, supra note 1, at 492-93.
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These steps alone may be enough to encourage the firm to get
serious about structural reform, but if not, the next step would be to
engage in lobbying efforts. In terms of lobbying strategy, it would be
important to identify a member of the city council or a county
commissioner who has power over which government contracts are
awarded and who is committed to racial and gender equality. Once
facts have been gathered as to the specific workings of the firm and the
resulting statistical disparities, a visit and presentation to the official,
together with a potential plaintiff who has been harmed by the
discriminatory practices, might inspire the official to actively engage
the employer in a dialogue. The goal would be for the official to
indicate to the employer that the government will only work with
employers that do not condone discriminatory decisionmaking.' 5 4 It is
possible, of course, that no such official will be available. If this is the
case, it may be best to go back to the identity organizations to see if
they have better contacts in the government with which to work. These
organizations may even be able to offer campaign support to an
otherwise disinterested official in exchange for the official's support
for the anti-discrimination efforts.
Another potentially powerful tool is the threat of a media
campaign, especially if the employer has a high profile and, therefore,
has substantial reputational interests. Waging an actual media
campaign may be much more difficult than threatening one. Because
of the psychology of blame issue, it may be the case that the media
does not view this as a story of interest, and even if published, it may
be a story that generates little to no pressure on the firm to change their
practices.1 55 If this is the case, advocates could find a hook to make the
story timely. For example, if the target firm has recently laid off
employees, and if those employees are disproportionally women or
people of color, advocates could tie the story to the recession by
showing that employers like the firm in question are using the bad
economy as an excuse to engage in discriminatory practices.
Applying the threat of litigation in the current jurisprudential
climate is difficult because the employer may not regard the threat
with much concern. 156 If the goal is to obtain a consent decree, most
154. If looking for a historical parallel, a fitting example that may provide valuable
lessons learned would be local governments being pressured into working only with union
workers. This idea is discussed further in RALPH K. WINTER, JR. & HARRY H. WELLINGTON,
THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (The Brookings Institution 1971); and DAVID T. STANLEY,
MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER UNION PRESSURE (The Brookings Institution 1972).
155. See supra Part II.C.
156. See supra Part ll.D. If it is nearly impossible to bring legal action against subtle or
structural discrimination in present-day courts, the threat of doing so lacks muscle.
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private employers would likely fight the effort to the end, and would
probably be successful. 157 Were the proposed set of actions to rely
exclusively on this threat, it would likely fail, which is why these
actions incorporate other stronger sources of leverage. In this situation,
liability avoidance is more likely to serve as an internal justification
for spending resources on reform than it is to serve as an externally
driven incentive. It may be the case that maintaining the threat of
litigation causes more harm than good and should not be a part of the
solution. By maintaining a traditional adversarial posture, it may be
difficult to form the partnership necessary for a flexible problem
solving approach. This, however, will be a concern for all of the faces
of this multi-pronged approach and is an issue that deserves further
attention.
During all of these steps, the plaintiffs' attorneys who will in
all likelihood drive this campaign must have all of the appropriate
actors in place in anticipation of the employer's eventual cooperation.
For example, if external organizational or managerial consultants are
needed, these consultants should be ready to act. This, like the other
steps outlined above, can only be described here in general terms
because each case would require a unique plan. These plans, however,
can and should be driven by guiding principles that would be relatively
consistent from employer to employer.
VI. CONCLUSION
Stakeholders can and should undertake certain specific actions
to make workplace antidiscrimination law more consistent with the
realities of modem discrimination. While I recommend one sample
action plan, this should not be seen as the only desirable approach. The
primary point of the proposed actions, in addition to reforming an
individual employer, is to help entrench the normative theory on which
they are based: the notion that the employer facilitation of
discrimination in the workplace is itself a normative and legal wrong.
In order to achieve institutionalized gains, multiple steps need to be
taken.
First, this type of action plan would need to be repeated many
times before any institutional effect would likely be seen. This would
necessitate carrying out a similar plan in multiple high-profile
157. This Article originally envisioned a consent decree as being important, but because
of the evidence suggesting that the Home Depot consent decree was less than successful and
because of the drawn-out contentious legal battle that would likely be associated with this
particular target, it became clear that a consent decree is not an ideal solution.
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environments with multiple high-profile employers. Second, there
must be a thorough evaluation of which practices were successful and
which were ineffective. It is crucial that this process is based upon an
accepted model of scientific inquiry. The actions I propose in this
article are resource-intensive and carry a relatively high risk of failure.
Even if successful in the short term, the efforts can be largely wasted
or even prove to be harmful in the long term if the lessons learned are
not properly documented. Indeed, an entire article or book could be
written on the process of institutionalizing these gains.
None of this, including the actions I propose in Part V, are
likely to be easy in practice, but I argue that by examining the current
dialogue on this problem, certain guiding principles can be identified
that would inform a series of actions with significant potential for
success. Perhaps more importantly, these resulting actions have the
potential to institutionalize knowledge and reinforce a normative
theory that holds employers accountable for condoning discrimination
resulting from implicit bias and other characteristics of the modem
workplace.

